Modern

 Modern philosophers have presented numerous different views of ultimate reality (apart from the classic theistic views which remain part of modern philosophy of religion).

Some of the most common positions which have been defended in modern academic philosophy include the following:

• Monism: Monism holds that all things derive from, or are identical with, a single fundamental reality.

• Dualism: Dualists posit two irreducible categories, such as mind and matter, that cannot be reduced to each other.
• Non-Reductive Pluralism: Non-reductive pluralists instead treat multiple conceptual or ontological domains as equally real without a single unifying base.
• Physicalist Foundationalism: Physicalists claim that the physical world is the ultimate ground, and that all higher-level facts depend on it. Reductionists equate everything with the physical, while non-reductive physicalists retain dependence but reject strict identity.

• Idealist Foundationalism: Idealists hold that mind, consciousness, or mental structure is metaphysically primary. Some analytic versions adopt cosmopsychism, while continental versions continue various forms of absolute idealism, the most influential one of which was Hegel's.

• Neo-Aristotelian Substance Foundationalism: This view treats substances (fundamental entities with intrinsic unity) as the ground of all other things. Properties and events depend on substances, which form the basic ontological layer.

• Process or Event Ontology: Process metaphysics asserts that reality’s ultimate constituents are dynamic processes or events rather than static substances. What is fundamental is becoming, change, or generative activity.

• Structuralism and Relational Ontologies: Structuralists claim that relations or structures are the fundamental reality, with objects reduced to nodes or positions within those structures. Continental structuralism interprets the fundamental as systems and relations rather than substances.

• Anti-Foundationalism: Anti-foundationalists deny that there is any ultimate ground or metaphysical base at all. Apparent foundations are viewed as contingent, historically constituted, or artifacts of our conceptual schemes.

• Quietism: Quietists hold that questions about an “absolute reality” arise from misuse of language and lack determinate content. They suspend metaphysical theorizing and treat such inquiries as dissolvable rather than answerable.

• Revisionary Naturalism: Revisionary naturalists reject traditional metaphysics and treat scientific ontology as the only legitimate guide to what exists. They decline to posit any further foundational reality beyond the evolving structure of scientific theory, which is always being revised and updated.

Contemporary philosophy notes the possibility that reality has no fundamental explanation and should be seen as a brute fact. Adherents of the principle of sufficient reason reject this, holding that everything must have a reason.